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The Scientific Study of Judicial Activism 
Frank B. Cross† and Stefanie A. Lindquist†† 
Criticism of the U.S. Supreme Court often centers on alle-
gations that the Court’s decisions reflect inappropriate “judicial 
activism.” Hundreds of law review articles every year address 
the issue,1 while the popular press also commonly critiques so-
called activist decisions.2 Even hundreds of judicial decisions 
have decried judicial activism.3 While there is no intrinsic rea-
son why an activist judiciary is inevitably or inherently prob-
lematic, the phrase typically carries a very negative connota-
tion—at least in modern discourse.4 
The attack on the Court for activism took hold during the 
Warren Court era, known for its numerous controversial rul-
ings on issues such as defendants’ rights.5 An activist Justice 
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 1. See Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial 
Activism,” 92 CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1442 (2004) (noting that the term had been 
discussed in over five thousand articles since 1990). 
 2. See id. at 1443 n.8 (“In the past decade (from 1994 to August 2004), 
‘judicial activism’ and its cognates have appeared 163 times in the Washington 
Post and another 135 times in the New York Times.”). 
 3. Id. at 1459 n.105. 
 4. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES 42 (2005) (observing that 
for some the “word ‘activist’ isn’t merely a description” but is “always an in-
sult”). But see Kmiec, supra note 1, at 1451 (“In its early days, the term ‘judi-
cial activist’ sometimes had a positive connotation . . . .”). 
 5. Although the Lochner era arguably was the true “heyday” of judicial 
activism, the term was not then used in critiques of the Court. See Kmiec, su-
pra note 1, at 1445. The earliest identified use was in 1947. Id. at 1446. There 
is now a “commonly held view that the Warren Court was, in fact, too activist.” 
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, A Remembrance of Things Past? Reflections on the 
Warren Court and the Struggle for Civil Rights, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1055, 
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believed “that the Supreme Court can play an affirmative role 
in promoting the social welfare.”6 Activism was often juxta-
posed against a policy of “judicial restraint” advocated most of-
ten by conservatives who opposed the Warren Court’s policy 
outcomes.7 As the Court became more conservative, however, 
liberals also took up the assault on judicial activism, particu-
larly in connection with the Rehnquist Court’s federalism deci-
sions.8 
Not all forms of judicial activism are universally con-
demned. Some of the decisions for which the Supreme Court is 
generally applauded, such as Brown v. Board of Education,9 
were in some respect activist decisions.10 Decisions now la-
mented, such as Korematsu v. United States,11 arguably re-
flected an orientation of judicial restraint.12 Ronald Dworkin 
has extolled the virtues of an activist judiciary in the protection 
of constitutional rights.13 Judicial activism is arguably “a way 
for a Court to live up to its obligation to serve as citadel of the 
public justice.”14 While this defense of activism certainly reso-
nates, it presumes that Justices embrace a certain honest sin-
cerity regarding constitutional interpretation, as opposed to a 
more result-oriented, ideological approach. 
Critics of judicial activism challenge this sincerity and 
claim that activist judges simply impose their policy prefer-
ences on society, without electoral accountability or fidelity to 
the Constitution.15 As calls to rein in the activist judiciary have 
 
1072 (2002). 
 6. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Supreme Court: 1947, FORTUNE, Jan. 
1947, at 73, 201, quoted in Kmiec, supra note 1, at 1446. 
 7. See infra notes 22–25 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra notes 29–34 and accompanying text. 
 9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 10. See KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 14 
(2006). 
 11. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 12. An argument can be made that Korematsu itself was an activist deci-
sion since, while it represented a deferential stance toward the executive 
branch, it failed to invalidate executive action that was clearly unconstitu-
tional. See infra notes 50–51 and accompanying text (explaining that exercis-
ing judicial restraint can sometimes be characterized as “activist”). 
 13. See, e.g., Stanley C. Brubaker, Reconsidering Dworkin’s Case for Judi-
cial Activism, 46 J. POL. 503, 503 (1984). 
 14. Rebecca L. Brown, Activism Is Not a Four-Letter Word, 73 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1257, 1273 (2002). 
 15. William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Ac-
tivism, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1217, 1245–53 (2002) (describing how partisan ac-
tivism occurs when a partisan agenda motivates judicial review). 
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entered popular discourse, however, the term “activism” has 
become devoid of meaningful content as it often reflects nothing 
more than an ideological harangue.16 Nevertheless, the under-
lying concern—that activist judges may act improperly—is le-
gitimate in light of our commitment to democratic values.17 Yet 
to evaluate this concern, we need both a precise definition of 
judicial activism and more rigor in its testing. This Article con-
stitutes an effort to produce a social scientific measure of judi-
cial activism that allows comparisons across courts and across 
Justices. 
In order to create such a measure, we must first define the 
concept of judicial activism carefully. The first part of this Arti-
cle analyzes definitions of judicial activism and reviews the fre-
quent criticism of the practice. We also review the limited em-
pirical research extant on activism. In the second part, we 
design an empirical measure that reflects, insofar as possible, 
what we consider the most defensible definition of judicial ac-
tivism: actions that are more clearly grounded in a Justice’s 
ideology than in legitimate legal sources. 
Construction of this measure first involves a simple com-
parison of the likelihood with which individual Justices vote to 
invalidate state or federal statutes, the factor commonly asso-
ciated with activist decision making. Because this metric fails 
to distinguish between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” statutory 
invalidations, we examine the extent to which a Justice’s votes 
to strike statutes are ideologically skewed, as well as the legal 
“strength” of the decision as reflected in both the average size 
of the vote coalition behind the Justices’ positions and the ex-
tent to which the Justices’ votes are consistent with the posi-
tion of the Solicitor General. While this remains an imperfect 
measure of activism, it represents an initial effort to create a 
more nuanced measure that allows us to compare the Justices 
over time. 
This more nuanced measure produces some shifts in the 
“ordering” of individual Justices in terms of their activist be-
havior. When we consider the percentage of votes to invalidate 
alone for Justices sitting on the Court between 1969 and 2004, 
some of the Justices appear fairly restraintist on the whole, 
 
 16. See infra notes 35–41 and accompanying text. 
 17. For an extensive discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of this 
“countermajoritarian difficulty,” see Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Aca-
demic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 
112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002). 
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such as Justice Thomas, or fairly activist, such as Justice Ken-
nedy. But when we add the additional dimensions to our meas-
ure, the results are reversed: Justice Thomas appears far more 
activist than Justice Kennedy. On the other hand, some of the 
Justices’ rankings remain constant. Justices Burger and White 
clearly emerge as the most restraintist Justices on the Court in 
the last thirty-five years, while Justices Marshall, Brennan, 
and Douglas are consistently the most activist. For some Jus-
tices who profess restraint, the evidence suggests that in some 
cases their jurisprudence accurately mirrored their rhetoric 
(Justice Rehnquist). However, for others (Justices Scalia and 
Thomas), the evidence does not support their rhetorical posi-
tions on judicial activism; these Justices do not demonstrate a 
consistently restraintist approach. Indeed, in more recent years 
(1994–2004), we find that several of the conservative Justices’ 
voting behavior reflects a relatively activist orientation, though 
to a lesser degree than the Warren Court liberals. 
I.  THE CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM  
Although criticism of judicial activism is rampant, those 
calling for the appointment of less activist judges seldom define 
the term. Indeed, activism has been labeled a “notoriously slip-
pery” concept.18 As one scholar remarked, although activism is 
“defined in a number of disparate, even contradictory, ways,” 
writers “persist in speaking about the concept without defining 
it.”19 
In many cases, complaints about judicial activism only re-
flect an amorphous lament about disfavored Court decisions. 
Our discussion begins with these complaints because they 
frame the term “judicial activism.” We then turn to a more dis-
ciplined analysis of judicial activism, beginning with the con-
ventional standard of social science: the extent to which judges 
overturn statutes. This measure, which reflects the extent to 
which the judiciary overturns the product of democratically 
elected bodies, fails to accommodate an important nuance: from 
a legal perspective, such actions may be appropriate given our 
system of checks and balances, especially when broad consen-
sus exists that a statute is plainly unconstitutional. Moreover, 
 
 18. Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in Judi-
cial Activism?, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1401, 1401 (2002). 
 19. Kmiec, supra note 1, at 1443. 
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a wide variety of other judicial actions—such as overturning 
precedent—may also be considered objectionably “activist.” 
At the core of the criticisms of judicial activism lies a con-
cern that the judiciary is acting outside its proper judicial role. 
Some complain that the activist judiciary is acting “like a legis-
lature” instead of a court.20 Exactly what it means for a court to 
“act like a legislature” is less clear. Sometimes, the criticism 
seems to mean little more than an observation that the Court is 
deciding a controversial issue, but at its heart the criticism sug-
gests the Court is creating law rather than applying it. Indeed, 
the key objection is that an activist Court somehow acts non-
judicially. As Justice Black noted in objection to a right to 
counsel ruling, “we are deciding what the Constitution is, not 
from what it says, but from what we think it would have been 
wise for the Framers to put in it.”21 Such “non-judicial” behav-
ior is the form of action that must be reflected in a social scien-
tific measure of judicial activism. 
A. THE POPULAR LAMENT AND THE MEANING OF ACTIVISM 
As noted above, complaints about judicial activism are 
common in popular discourse. In the Warren Court era, conser-
vatives complained loudly, even calling for the impeachment of 
Supreme Court Justices.22 Conservatives called for “judicial re-
straint” or “strict constructionism” in place of liberal judicial 
activism, contending that “when liberal Courts overturn de-
mocratically enacted laws in favor of liberal, activist constitu-
tionalism, they destroy[] citizens’ rights to democratic partici-
pation and self government.”23 Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson noted 
that “[m]any of us came of age concerned about the excessive 
activism of the Warren and Burger Courts.”24 During this time, 
 
 20. See id. at 1471 (“Judges are labeled judicial activists when they ‘legis-
late from the bench.’”). 
 21. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 250 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting 
in part and concurring in part). 
 22. See Robert L. Brown, From Earl Warren to Wendell Griffen: A Study of 
Judicial Intimidation and Judicial Self-Restraint, 28 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. 
REV. 1, 2–6 (2005) (discussing proposals to impeach Chief Justice Earl War-
ren). 
 23. Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, A Preference for Deference? The 
Supreme Court and Judicial Review, 57 POL. RES. Q. 131, 132 (2004). 
 24. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Is There a Distinctive Conservative Jurispru-
dence?, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1383, 1383 (2002); see also John H. Blume et al., 
Education and Interrogation: Comparing Brown and Miranda, 90 CORNELL L. 
REV. 321, 344 (2005) (referring to the “bold judicial activism of the Warren 
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a “judicial liberal believed that the enlightened approach of the 
courts was the answer to many social problems while a judicial 
conservative placed faith in traditional democratic processes.”25 
Perhaps the standard complaint of the era was about “liberal, 
activist judges” substituting their “personal preferences” for the 
“will of the people.”26 This connection between activism and lib-
eralism has taken such a firm hold on public perceptions that 
“whenever a politician uses the term ‘activist judge,’ the word 
liberal is sure to follow.”27 Even after the Warren Court ended, 
one still sees claims about liberal judicial activism. In his re-
cent campaigns, President George W. Bush emphasized the 
need to prevent liberal judicial activism.28 
In today’s world, however, the tables have turned as 
“[a]ccusations that conservatives on the Rehnquist Court are 
the real judicial activists have become commonplace.”29 The 
National Director of the American Civil Liberties Union de-
clared that the Rehnquist Court was a “conservative court that 
has also become one of the most activist courts in American his-
tory.”30 Many prominent law professors agree. According to 
Cass Sunstein, for example, the Rehnquist Court reflected “a 
remarkable period of right-wing judicial activism.”31 Erwin 
Chemerinsky criticizes conservative judges for engaging in “ag-
gressive conservative judicial activism.”32 Jack Balkin and 
Sandy Levinson similarly argue that the Warren Court’s “judi-
cial activism has been replaced with one much harsher and 
 
Court era”); Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 
83 N.C. L. REV. 847, 929 (2005) (“People who came of age during or after the 
Warren Court era tend to associate judicial activism with liberal causes.”). 
 25. Wilkinson, supra note 24, at 1383. Both critics and admirers of the 
Warren Court accept the claim that it was an activist Court. See Kmiec, supra 
note 1, at 1473. 
 26. Lori A. Ringhand, Judicial Activism: An Empirical Examination of 
Voting Behavior on the Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 CONST. COMMENT. (forth-
coming 2007) (manuscript at 1), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=765445. 
 27. Healy, supra note 24, at 929. 
 28. See Ringhand, supra note 26 (manuscript at 1 n.2). President Reagan 
did likewise. Id. 
 29. Orin S. Kerr, Upholding the Law, LEGAL AFF., Mar./Apr. 2003, at 31, 
31. 
 30. See Edward Walsh, An Activist Court Mixes Its High-Profile Messages, 
WASH. POST, July 2, 2000, at A6. 
 31. Cass R. Sunstein, Tilting the Scales Rightward, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 
2001, at A23. 
 32. Erwin Chemerinsky, Perspective on Justice: And Federal Law Got 
Narrower, Narrower, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 2000, at B11. 
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more conservative.”33 While much of the criticism centers on 
the Rehnquist Court’s exercise of judicial review to invalidate 
federal enactments, the Court’s conservatives are also criticized 
for rendering decisions that are “unrestrained by precedent.”34 
From this experience, “judicial activism” apparently is an 
effective rhetorical tool in ideological argument, but no consen-
sus exists regarding its specific meaning.35 Instead, the phrase 
is used as an epithet “to bludgeon legal and political oppo-
nents.”36 As Judge Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain observes, 
“[j]udicial activism is not always easily detected, because the 
critical elements of judicial activism either are subjective or 
defy clear and concrete definition.”37 Judge Frank H. Easter-
brook suggests that the term is “empty” and simply a “mask” 
for the critic’s own substantive position on the Court.38 Randy 
Barnett likewise declares that the criticism was generally an 
“empty” one,39 while Justice Scalia has characterized criticisms 
of judicial activism as “nothing but fluff.”40 At her confirmation 
hearings, Justice Ginsburg suggested that judicial activism was 
“a label too often pressed into service by critics of court results 
rather than the legitimacy of court decisions.”41 
These comments emphasize that many contemporary invo-
cations of judicial activism are either meaningless or simply 
ideological rhetoric. Yet we argue that the common misuse of 
the term does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that a con-
cept of activism cannot be more carefully defined and ulti-
mately measured.42 This section addresses the ability to pro-
 
 33. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional 
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1092 (2001). 
 34. See Marshall, supra note 15, at 1233. 
 35. See id. at 1217 (observing that, for some, judicial activism simply 
“means a decision one does not like”). 
 36. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 408 (2002). 
 37. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, On Judicial Activism: Judges and the Con-
stitution Today, OPEN SPACES Q., Mar. 2000, at 20, 23, available at http://www 
.open-spaces.com/article-v3n1-oscannlain.php. 
 38. See Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 1401. 
 39. Randy E. Barnett, Is the Rehnquist Court an “Activist” Court? The 
Commerce Clause Cases, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2002). 
 40. See Charles Lane, No Unanimity on Holding on to High Esteem, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2002, at A13. 
 41. Rorie Sherman et al., Clinton’s Stand on NEA Remains a Puzzle, 
NAT’L L.J., July 19, 1993, at 5, 29, quoted in Donald H. Zeigler, The New Activ-
ist Court, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1367, 1367–68 (1996). 
 42. See Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 
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duce such a determination with the precision required for 
quantitative analysis. 
B. THE CONVENTIONAL STANDARD 
The most common standard for evaluating judicial activism 
is the extent to which judges invalidate legislative enactments. 
Judge Richard A. Posner suggests that a basic element of judi-
cial activism is a court’s willingness to act “contrary to the will 
of the other branches of government,” as in striking down a 
statute.43 Sunstein contends that “it is best to measure judicial 
activism by seeing how often a court strikes down the actions of 
other parts of government, especially those of Congress.”44 Ju-
dicial activism is in fact “most often associated with judicial in-
validation of decisions by elected representatives.”45 
Political scientists generally contend that “the most dra-
matic instances of a lack of judicial restraint—or, conversely, 
the manifestation of judicial activism—are decisions that de-
clare acts of Congress and, to a lesser extent, those of state and 
local governments unconstitutional.”46 This standard is com-
monly invoked and probably the most common measure for ju-
dicial activism.47 Yet it has not gone unchallenged, as discussed 
in the following section. 
C. CRITICISMS AND REFINEMENTS OF THE CONVENTIONAL 
STANDARD 
While empirical research on judicial activism commonly 
employs the conventional standard, the standard suffers some 
theoretical shortcomings. In short, political and legal elites, as 
 
U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1141 (2002) (arguing that the term is not “inherently 
empty” and that it can be a “helpful category in that it focuses attention on the 
judiciary’s institutional role rather than the merits of particular decisions”). 
 43. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 
320 (1996). 
 44. SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 42–43. 
 45. Marshall, supra note 15, at 1223. 
 46. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 36, at 413; see also Howard & Segal, su-
pra note 23, at 131 (using this proxy for judicial activism). 
 47. See, e.g., Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 312, 434 (1997) (“[C]harges of judicial activism are often lev-
eled when a court strikes down a democratically enacted statute; this indeed is 
the most frequent target of Judge Bork’s criticism.”); Rorie Spill Solberg & Ste-
fanie A. Lindquist, Activism, Ideology, and Federalism: Judicial Behavior in 
Constitutional Challenges Before the Rehnquist Court, 1986–2000, 3 J. EM-
PIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 237, 238–39 (2006). 
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well as the general public, accept that the judiciary’s institu-
tional responsibilities sometimes involve the invalidation of un-
constitutional statutes. Exercise of the power of judicial review 
might be called “activist,” but the mere exercise of the power 
alone is not what animates critics of activist decisions.48 Should 
a state ignore the Thirteenth Amendment and reinstitute slav-
ery, few would criticize the Court for striking down such legis-
lation, nor would such a ruling be deemed “activist.”49 More-
over, activism is not limited solely to incidents in which the 
judiciary invalidates a statute; as Randy Barnett argues, “it is 
activist for courts to adopt doctrines that contradict the text of 
the Constitution either to uphold or nullify a law.”50 Indeed, 
Michael Stokes Paulsen coined the phrase “activist judicial re-
straint” for decisions in which the Court improperly fails to 
strike down an unconstitutional statute or fails to reverse an 
illegitimate judicial precedent.51 This approach seems illogi-
cally to conflate “bad” with “activist,” but a correct finding that 
a statute is constitutionally invalid is not inappropriate activ-
ism. 
A standard of judicial activism that focuses solely on statu-
tory invalidation thus fails to account for the possibility that 
the exercise of judicial review is justified on legal grounds. Yet 
modifying the standard to account for this nuance makes de-
termination of judicial activism contingent on the commenta-
tor’s view of what the Constitution requires. There is no reason 
to privilege an evaluator’s conclusion about what is “truly con-
stitutional” over that of the Supreme Court. Indeed, this view 
typically masks the evaluator’s ideological bias. Conservatives 
believe liberal Justices are activist (or vice versa) simply be-
cause they disagree with the case outcome on ideological 
grounds. This approach provides no basis for a non-ideological 
test of judicial activism. 
 
 48. See Marshall, supra note 15, at 1224 (“Even a ‘non-activist’ Court 
would (and should) strike down a law if the enacting Congress did not have 
the appropriate regard for constitutional limitations.”). 
 49. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 29, at 33–34 (“Consider the Dickerson case 
that upheld Miranda. The Supreme Court’s decision not to overrule Miranda 
required it to strike down a 1968 federal law Congress had passed to thumb its 
nose at the Warren Court. It’s hard to see Dickerson as an activist decision: 
The court adhered to precedent and confirmed that a law long thought to be 
unconstitutional was in fact invalid.”). 
 50. Barnett, supra note 39, at 1276. 
 51. The concept is discussed in Young, supra note 42, at 1174–81. 
CROSS AND LINDQUIST_4FMT 6/15/2007 10:50:06 AM 
2007] SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 1761 
 
Sunstein has sought to rescue this approach to defining ju-
dicial activism by extending it to cases in which the Court over-
turns legislation that is arguably constitutional.52 This ap-
proach recognizes a certain zone of uncertainty about the 
constitutionality of legislation. Sunstein’s approach contends 
that the Court should defer to legislative judgment when stat-
utes fall within that zone of uncertainty.53 The proper judicial 
role, in this view, is limited to striking down clearly unconstitu-
tional statutes.54 Judge Easterbrook adopted a similar stan-
dard, defining activism as the invalidation of a statute “unless 
the application of the Constitution or statute is so clear that it 
has the traditional qualities of law rather than political or 
moral philosophy.”55 
Easterbrook’s and Sunstein’s approaches mirror that of 
James Bradley Thayer, who argued that the Court should only 
strike statutes that are clearly unconstitutional.56 Thayer ar-
gued that constitutional language is inevitably indeterminate, 
and therefore that reasonable minds could differ over whether 
a statute comports with the Constitution’s provisions.57 When 
such reasonable disagreement exists, Thayer suggested that 
courts uphold whatever laws are rationally within the Consti-
tution and strike only those whose unconstitutionality is clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt.58 For much of our history, the 
Thayerian standard prevailed, with the Court according a sig-
nificant presumption of constitutionality to federal statutes.59 
Multiple justifications for this standard exist, ranging from the 
 
 52. See Cass R. Sunstein, Taking Over the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 
2002, at A19. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See id. 
 55. Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 1404. 
 56. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893) (arguing that a court 
should invalidate a law only “when those who have the right to make laws 
have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one,—so clear 
that it is not open to rational question”). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. at 144–45. 
 59. See Evan H. Caminker, Thayerian Deference to Congress and Supreme 
Court Supermajority Rule: Lessons from the Past, 78 IND. L.J. 73 (2003). 
Caminker suggests that the recent frequency of invalidation of federal stat-
utes is “historically anomalous,” id. at 74, and reports that at the nation’s be-
ginning, “it was widely understood that to the extent federal courts had au-
thority to declare void acts of Congress, they could properly do so only when 
the constitutional violation was quite clear,” id. at 80. 
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need to defer to a co-equal branch to respect for a more democ-
ratic or populist constitutional interpretation.60 The latter justi-
fication resonates strongly today in the presence of realist be-
liefs that Supreme Court Justices’ decisions are ideological and 
grounded in individual policy preferences rather than the law. 
However, the Thayerian approach arguably does little to 
ameliorate the ideological bias associated with claims of judi-
cial activism. Rather, the approach merely shifts the impact of 
ideology from the analysis of the case outcome to the analysis of 
the zone of rational uncertainty. Thus, a conventional standard 
modified by a Thayerian assessment would fail to defuse accu-
sations that charges of activism are driven by ideological con-
siderations. Under this rule, a finding that an unconstitutional 
statute was unconstitutional might be labeled activist on the 
basis that the statute’s unconstitutionality was not sufficiently 
certain.61 Indeed, the notion of uncertainty in practice may it-
self be so amorphous and malleable that it facilitates—rather 
than reduces—the potential impact of ideology in the evalua-
tion of judicial activism.62 Nevertheless, the Thayerian stan-
dard remains relevant to contemporary analyses.63 
Discussions of judicial activism that focus solely on the ex-
ercise of judicial review also fail to account for other actions 
that are arguably “activist.” According to one scholar, judicial 
activism can be defined along six dimensions: 
  (1) Majoritarianism—the degree to which policies adopted through 
democratic processes are judicially negated. 
  (2) Interpretive Stability—the degree to which earlier court deci-
sions, doctrines, or interpretations are altered. 
  (3) Interpretive Fidelity—the degree to which constitutional pro-
visions are interpreted contrary to the clear intentions of their draft-
ers or the clear implications of the language used. 
 
 60. See id. at 83–84. 
 61. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Thayer’s Clear Mistake, 88 NW. U. L. 
REV. 269, 275 (1993) (arguing that courts are responsible for correcting uncon-
stitutional statutes, even in the absence of clarity). 
 62. Every decision is to some degree uncertain. If it were not, it would not 
reach a trial court, much less the Supreme Court. The zone of uncertainty 
cannot be quantified in terms of a percentage of uncertainty. For Sunstein, the 
question is whether “reasonable” minds may differ over a statute’s unconstitu-
tionality. See Sunstein, supra note 52. But this focus simply shifts the decision 
rule to the still more amorphous definition of “reasonable.” In attempting to 
pin down judicial activism, this approach simply makes the concept more 
vague. 
 63. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 59, at 86 (reviewing a number of more 
contemporary arguments for the Thayerian standard). 
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  (4) Substance/Democratic Process Distinction—the degree to 
which judicial decisions make substantive policy rather than affect 
the preservation of democratic processes. 
  (5) Specificity of Policy—the degree to which a judicial decision es-
tablishes policy itself as opposed to leaving discretion to other [gov-
ernmental actors]. 
  (6) Availability of an Alternate Policymaker—the degree to which 
a judicial decision supersedes serious consideration of the same prob-
lems by other [political actors].64 
Ernie Young more recently has produced an alternative list 
with a broader focus, suggesting that activism may entail: 
  (1) second-guessing the federal political branches or state govern-
ments; 
  (2) departing from text and/or history; 
  (3) departing from judicial precedent; 
  (4) issuing broad or “maximalist” holdings rather than narrow or 
“minimalist” ones; 
  (5) exercising broad remedial powers; and 
  (6) deciding cases according to the partisan political preferences of 
the judges.65 
Both lists incorporate or reflect the central concern over 
countermajoritarianism that is often associated with charges of 
judicial activism, as well as the broader critique that activist 
judges usurp the legislative function. The following section de-
scribes these alternative dimensions of judicial activism. 
D. OTHER FORMS OF ACTIVISM 
Although much of the discussion and study of judicial ac-
tivism focuses on decisions overturning statutes, the dimen-
sions of activism set forth in the section above make clear that 
the concept is multidimensional. For example, activism might 
be found in the mere interpretation of statutes. A Justice might 
interpret a statute in a manner contrary to what the legislature 
meant or wrote as its text. In some ways, this form of activism 
might be more egregious than striking a statute; instead of 
leaving a blank legislative slate—as in the case of invalidating 
a law—such a misinterpretation leaves in place a statute that 
now reflects the policy preferences of the judges rather than the 
 
 64. Bradley C. Canon, Defining the Dimensions of Judicial Activism, 66 
JUDICATURE 236, 239 (1983). 
 65. Young, supra note 42, at 1144. William Marshall presented a similar 
list during the symposium at which Young produced his list. See Marshall, su-
pra note 15, at 1220. 
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legislature. This form of activism is moderated, however, by the 
ability of the legislature to rewrite the statute66 and by the fact 
that judicial language is not self-enforcing.67 
Overturning or ignoring applicable precedent may also 
constitute a form of judicial activism.68 When Justices overturn 
precedent they more clearly trammel the actions of their prede-
cessors than the privileges of the coordinate branches, but 
these decisions are often challenged as activist, given the gen-
eral standard of judicial fealty to precedent. The framers of the 
Constitution considered precedent to “derive from the nature of 
judicial power, and intended that [it] would limit the judicial 
power delegated to the courts by Article III of the Constitu-
tion.”69 Regularly overruling or distinguishing away precedent 
might therefore be considered inappropriate judicial activism. 
Critics have charged the Rehnquist Court with this form of con-
servative judicial activism,70 and the Justices have themselves 
occasionally criticized their brethren for judicial activism in ig-
noring the Court’s precedents.71 
Just as invalidating a statute is not necessarily inappro-
priate judicial activism, neither is reversing a precedent. If con-
sensus exists that the initial precedent was “wrongly” decided, 
its reversal is appropriate. The theory is: “If the Constitution 
says X and a prior judicial decision says Y, a court has not 
merely the power, but the obligation, to prefer the Constitu-
 
 66. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory In-
terpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 344 tbl.4 (1991) (reporting that 
Congress rewrote statutes to override 121 Supreme Court decisions between 
1967 and 1991). The effectiveness of these overrides is uncertain, however, be-
cause the Court also interprets the new statutory language. See Frank B. 
Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court De-
cisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1451–57 (2001) (discussing the Court’s 
ability to limit the effect of the override through interpretation). 
 67. See Cross & Nelson, supra note 66, at 1470–71 (discussing how the 
effect of Supreme Court decisions is limited by implementation decisions of the 
other branches). 
 68. See Kmiec, supra note 1, at 1466 (“Judges regularly admonish their 
colleagues for judicial activism when they contravene precedent . . . .”). 
 69. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated 
as moot en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 70. See, e.g., Michael Wells, French and American Judicial Opinions, 19 
YALE J. INT’L L. 81, 123 (1994) (“The current Court’s dismantling of the federal 
habeas corpus remedy for state prisoners is as fine an example of unrestrained 
judicial activism and lack of candor as anything the Warren Court ever did.”). 
 71. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 98–99 (2000) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 137 (1982) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). 
CROSS AND LINDQUIST_4FMT 6/15/2007 10:50:06 AM 
2007] SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 1765 
 
tion.”72 Indeed, perhaps the original precedent was an instance 
of “judicial activism,” such that its reversal would constitute an 
effort to reorient the legal doctrine to defer more appropriately 
to the elected branches.73 Moreover, a court may confront a cir-
cumstance where it will either have to strike down a statute or 
have to overrule one of its precedents.74 The “activist” criticism 
is not meaningful when the Court must essentially choose be-
tween two arguably activist outcomes. 
Another form of judicial activism involves not the decision 
but the opinion or remedy. Writing an unnecessarily broad 
opinion with applicability beyond the unique circumstances of 
the case before the Court might be considered activist. Alterna-
tively, the nature of the relief ordered might appear to have an 
“activist” dimension. In some cases, courts have involved them-
selves in the “day-to-day running of public institutions” or de-
manded public “expenditures amounting to millions of dol-
lars.”75 These are seemingly activist judicial measures, 
regardless of whether the underlying decision invalidated a 
statute or overturned a precedent. They certainly assume pow-
ers generally reserved for other governmental institutions. 
The discussion above does not yield a clear definition of ju-
dicial activism, but it elicits some core principles important to 
such a definition. Activism is characterized by the Court’s fail-
ure to act “like a judiciary.”76 Although no precise definition ar-
ticulates the proper judicial role, we may identify some pa-
rameters to such action. First, a judiciary should use “accepted 
interpretive methodology”:77 it should interpret governing texts 
 
 72. Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 27–28 (1994). However, for precedent to have meaning it 
must be given some deference even when a Justice believes it may have been 
mistaken. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 575 (1987) 
(“[I]f we are truly arguing from precedent, then the fact that something was 
decided before gives it present value despite our current belief that the previ-
ous decision was erroneous.”). 
 73. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Inter-
pretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 
577–78 (2005) (“The Warren and Burger Courts casually overruled a great 
many criminal-procedure precedents . . . . Should the current Court respect 
the Warren and Burger Court precedents, or should those decisions be treated 
in the same cavalier fashion as the older decisions they overruled?”). 
 74. This was the circumstance encountered in Dickerson. See Kerr, supra 
note 29, at 33–34. 
 75. Young, supra note 42, at 1154. 
 76. See supra text accompanying notes 20–21. 
 77. See Kmiec, supra note 1, at 1473. 
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using approved cannons of interpretation and other appropriate 
“tools of the trade” and not distort the meaning of those texts 
simply to further judges’ personal policy preferences.78 The ac-
cepted judicial methodology also involves some fealty to prece-
dent and consistency with past decisions.79 While this legal 
model of judging is difficult to capture simply, it requires deci-
sions according to tenets of the law, rather than the personal 
preferences of the judge. 
Thus, judges fail to act within their proper role when they 
engage in “result-oriented judging,” whereby their decisions are 
driven by their ideological preferences concerning substantive 
case outcomes (e.g., liberal Justices preferring liberal policy 
outcomes and conservative Justices preferring conservative 
outcomes).80 As a result, based on ideological predispositions, a 
liberal Justice would rule in favor of criminal defendants’ 
rights, whereas a conservative Justice would oppose such 
rights. Such ideological judging has been called “the essence of 
judicial activism.”81 For example, a critic of the current Court 
argues that the “conservatives’ record reflects a jurisprudence 
of judicial results, not of judicial method—nothing more and 
nothing less.”82 
There is considerable empirical support for claims that the 
Supreme Court has engaged in result-oriented judging. While 
this legal realist view has a long pedigree, the empirical case 
has been advanced most prominently by Jeffrey Segal and Har-
old Spaeth in connection with the “attitudinal model” of judicial 
decision making.83 The authors carefully analyzed each Jus-
tice’s votes over different periods of the Court’s history, finding 
a high correlation between the Justices’ values and their 
votes.84 Considerable additional research has confirmed these 
findings.85 The empirical evidence mustered in these studies 
 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. at 1466–71. 
 80. See id. at 1475–76. 
 81. O’Scannlain, supra note 37, at 23 (“When a judge is swayed by his own 
sentiment rather than considerations of deference, predictability, and uni-
formity, he fails by definition to apply the law faithfully.”). 
 82. See Marshall, supra note 15, at 1255. 
 83. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). 
 84. Id. at 228–29. 
 85. Much of this research and its implications are summarized in Frank 
B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate 
Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 265–79 (1997). 
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supports the commonplace belief that certain Justices are “con-
servative” or “liberal” and systematically reach decisions that 
conform to those ideological preferences.86 The vigorous politi-
cal debate over Supreme Court nominations is ample testimony 
to the effect of judicial ideology in the decision-making process. 
“Result-oriented judging” is something of an epithet, but its 
pejorative nature may unfairly presume intentionality on the 
Justices’ part to circumvent the law in order to reach a certain 
result. Judge O’Scannlain thus emphasizes that for judicial ac-
tivism, “a critical consideration is the state of mind of the alleg-
edly activist judge.”87 Others embrace such a “scienter” stan-
dard for discerning judicial activism.88 Given the impossibility 
of reading judges’ minds, this standard makes diagnosis of ju-
dicial activism impossible. Whether the ideological effect is a 
conscious or subconscious one, however, the results are the 
same. 
Even a sincere judge might prove to be result-oriented due 
to the concept grounded in psychological research known as 
motivated reasoning.89 Motivated reasoning involves the sub-
conscious desire to reach a particular outcome—a desire which 
influences cognitive processes in a “biased” manner90 and can 
explain ideological patterns in judicial decision making.91 Ac-
cording to this account, the process of judicial interpretation 
may occur “so quickly that the judge never consciously consid-
ers the reasons for the choice and therefore believes that the 
decision was compelled by objective, external sources.”92 The 
foremost scholars of the attitudinal model of judicial decision 
making observe that motivated reasoning could explain their 
findings.93 Indeed, the inevitable presence of such motivated 
 
 86. Id. at 277. 
 87. O’Scannlain, supra note 37, at 23. 
 88. See Kmiec, supra note 1, at 1476 (finding the “scienter” element useful 
because it particularly “limits the universe of ‘activist’ decisions”). 
 89. See, e.g., Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSY-
CHOL. BULL. 480, 482–83 (1990) (suggesting that “people motivated to arrive 
at a particular conclusion attempt to be rational and to construct a justifica-
tion for their desired conclusion” but only reach the desired conclusion if they 
can support it with evidence). 
 90. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Causes of the Recent Turn in Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 51 DUKE L.J. 307, 352–53 (2001). 
 91. See Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1457, 1477–78 (2003). 
 92. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 
GEO. L.J. 353, 407 (1989). 
 93. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 36, at 433. 
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reasoning might be considered a justification for a Thayerian 
rule of statutory invalidation.94 
The practical concern, however, involves judicial outcomes, 
not judicial motivations. Consequently, activist Court decisions 
that are the product of “innocent” motivated reasoning are, 
from a practical standpoint, no different than identical deci-
sions that are the product of intentional political motivations. 
Striking down a statute on grounds that it violates the Consti-
tution has the same pragmatic effect regardless of the Justices’ 
intentions. Hence, we need not read judicial minds, but instead 
can examine outcomes for evidence of judicial activism. 
E. EXISTING EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
The best known empirical review of Supreme Court judicial 
activism is arguably found in a newspaper editorial, rather 
than in formal research. In 2005, the New York Times pub-
lished an editorial by Paul Gewirtz and Chad Golder which 
analyzed decisions since 1994 that invalidated federal laws as 
unconstitutional.95 The authors found that conservative Jus-
tices were far more likely to strike down federal laws than more 
liberal Justices and thus were arguably more “activist.”96 While 
the Gewirtz and Golder editorial is cited by liberals critical of 
the new conservative judicial activism, it considered federal 
statutes only. Critics claimed that this failure to consider activ-
ism with respect to state laws biased the conclusions against 
the Rehnquist Court conservatives.97 
Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth also reviewed Supreme 
Court declarations of unconstitutionality, examining votes in 
170 cases between 1986 and 1998 in which the Court found a 
law unconstitutional. The vast majority of the Justices dis-
played a significant ideological effect—liberal Justices voted to 
strike conservative laws and uphold liberal ones, while conser-
vatives on the Court ruled the opposite.98 According to the evi-
 
 94. See Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Deci-
sion Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 
1499, 1524 (1998) (suggesting that motivated reasoning is “particularly likely 
when people face ambiguity rather than informational clarity”). 
 95. See Paul Gewirtz & Chad Golder, So Who Are the Activists?, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 6, 2005, at A19. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Kerr, supra note 29, at 34 (“[T]he focus on decisions striking down 
federal laws unfairly stacks the deck against the Rehnquist Court.”). 
 98. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 36, at 415–16; see also SEGAL & SPAETH, 
supra note 83, at 320–22 (discussing the votes of twenty-five Justices who 
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dence presented, judicial activism was neither liberal nor con-
servative, but nearly universal.99 Segal and Robert Howard fol-
lowed up this finding with a more detailed analysis.100 They 
examined 248 cases from the 1985 to the 1994 Supreme Court 
terms in which one of the parties argued that a state or federal 
law was invalid.101 Segal and Howard then evaluated the fre-
quency with which individual Justices supported a finding of 
unconstitutionality, depending on whether the request was 
made by liberals or conservatives.102 After examining other po-
tential determinants of the outcome, the authors concluded 
that “ideological considerations predominate in the decision to 
strike legislation.”103 
In a more recent publication in the Journal of Empirical 
Legal Studies, Rorie Spill Solberg and Stefanie Lindquist ana-
lyzed Justices’ votes to invalidate state and federal legislation 
for the period from 1986 to 2000.104 This study focused on 
whether the conservative Justices’ expressed desire to protect 
states’ rights via an enhanced federalism doctrine actually 
structured their exercise of judicial review, or whether their 
votes to invalidate state and federal legislation were better ex-
plained in terms of the ideological direction of the statute at is-
sue.105 The authors found that the Justices’ preference for cer-
tain substantive policies trumped their professed concern for 
deference to state law and legislative policy.106 
In another recent study, Lori Ringhand conducted an 
analysis of the data summarized in Gewirtz and Golder’s New 
York Times editorial.107 She confirmed their finding that the 
conservative Justices of the Rehnquist Court were distinctly 
more likely to invalidate federal legislation and overturn 
precedent than the liberal Justices.108 In addition, Ringhand 
 
voted in cases where the Court declared statutes unconstitutional between 
1953 and 1989). 
 99. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 36, at 415. 
 100. See Howard & Segal, supra note 23, at 131. 
 101. See id. at 134. 
 102. See id. at 136. 
 103. Id. at 138. For example, Justice Brennan was fifty percent more likely 
to strike down a conservative law than a liberal law. See id. 
 104. Solberg & Lindquist, supra note 47, at 239. 
 105. See id. at 237. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See Ringhand, supra note 26 (manuscript at 2). 
 108. See id. (manuscript at 7–8, 27). This difference was largely due to fed-
eralism cases in which the conservatives were far more likely to strike down 
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expanded on the limited editorial to find that the Court’s liberal 
Justices were more likely to invalidate state legislation.109 
However, she concluded that the conservatives would overturn 
state legislation to advance conservative ends (such as in Tak-
ings Clause cases)110 and even did so in the most legally con-
testable cases.111 Thus, Ringhand confirmed the basic findings 
of the editorial. 
To date, the empirical research exploring judicial activism 
has only scratched the surface. This research is limited in part 
because it focuses primarily on one dimension of judicial activ-
ism involving the invalidation of legislative enactments. In the 
next section, we seek to extend this empirical research by creat-
ing a more expansive measure of activism that accounts for ad-
ditional factors. We then use that measure to evaluate the rela-
tive activism of the Justices on the Court since 1968. 
II.  OPERATIONALIZING JUDICIAL ACTIVISM  
As noted above, in this section we create a measure of judi-
cial activism that is based on the Justices’ propensity to invali-
date legislation, but which also attempts to account for the 
strength of the legal case in favor of a statute’s constitutional-
ity. We begin with a discussion of the Justices’ differential re-
sponses to state and federal legislation. 
A. REVIEWING THE RECORD OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: STATE AND 
FEDERAL 
Evidence of some measures of judicial activism is readily 
available. One can simply count the number of times that each 
Justice voted to invalidate or uphold a federal law. This was 
the approach taken by Gewirtz and Golder in identifying con-
servative Justices as activist.112 While this method provides 
useful insight into activism with respect to congressional en-
 
federal statutes. There was relatively little difference in other case categories. 
Id. (manuscript at 9–10). 
 109. See id. (manuscript at 17). This difference was largely due to criminal 
procedure decisions. See id. (manuscript at 18–19). 
 110. See id. (manuscript at 23). 
 111. Ringhand found that conservatives were more likely to strike down 
federal statutes in close decisions (e.g., five-to-four minimum winning coali-
tions) than in easier cases (e.g., unanimous decisions). See id. (manuscript at 
15). The same was true for decisions to invalidate state statutes. Id. (manu-
script at 22–23). 
 112. See Gewirtz & Golder, supra note 95. 
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actments, it is not comprehensive because it does not consider 
the invalidation of state statutes. Finding a state law unconsti-
tutional also replaces an elected legislature’s policy determina-
tion with a judicial decision, thus affecting the dynamics of fed-
eralism. 
We acknowledge that striking down state laws is not nec-
essarily comparable to invalidating federal laws. Judge Easter-
brook argues that invalidating federal laws is more activist, 
contending that “it is more presumptuous for tenured federal 
officials to upset decisions of the political branches of the na-
tional government, than it is for the national government (of 
which judges are just agents) to impose its will on the 
states.”113 Thayer himself adopted this differential standard.114 
Striking down a federal law changes policy for an entire nation, 
at least theoretically, while invalidating a state law may affect 
the policy of only a single state. Thus, the invalidation of a fed-
eral law might be considered more significant and activist than 
the invalidation of a state law. 
On the other hand, the invalidation of state laws can have 
important pragmatic implications. Arguably, the significance of 
such a decision is grounded more in the policy of the legisla-
ture’s action than in the nature of the legislature itself. Cer-
tainly, many of the most dramatic and allegedly activist Su-
preme Court decisions, such as those involving substantive due 
process privacy interests,115 typically involve the invalidation of 
state, rather than federal, laws. Moreover, striking down a sin-
gle state’s law may functionally implicate the laws of many 
other states and may even make unconstitutional a related fed-
eral law. Certainly, the principles enunciated in Roe v. Wade,116 
though they directly affected Texas law only, had a substantial 
impact on the laws of other states and even of the federal gov-
ernment.117 Furthermore, legislators at any level of government 
 
 113. Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 1404.  
 114. See Thayer, supra note 56, at 154–55 (arguing that “national courts” 
should grant great deference to the enactments of a “co-ordinate department” 
of the federal government). 
 115. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003) (declaring un-
constitutional a Texas law prohibiting sexual relations between persons of the 
same sex). 
 116. 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973) (finding a Texas abortion statute unconstitu-
tional). 
 117. See Lynn D. Wardle, The Quandry of Pro-Life Free Speech: A Lesson 
from the Abolitionists, 62 ALB. L. REV. 853, 863 (1999) (“Roe radically changed 
the substance of abortion law . . . .”). 
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will likely feel constrained by the Court’s constitutional prece-
dents, regardless of whether those precedents involve state or 
federal law.118 Thus, the significance of precedents that invali-
date state laws clearly extends far beyond the particular law 
challenged before the Court. 
By contrast, the invalidation of a federal law on federalism 
grounds may not be practically very significant. For example, 
the United States v. Lopez decision, striking down the federal 
law banning guns in schools on federalism grounds,119 may be 
of little practical significance if states, localities, or even the 
schools enforce a similar ban.120 Indeed, a decision striking 
down a federal law on federalism grounds may have much less 
practical effect than a decision striking down a state law on 
First Amendment grounds, because the former, at most, pre-
cludes only federal government action and not similar regula-
tion by the states, while the latter can bar action by all levels of 
government. A federalism-based decision to strike a federal law 
may not even constrain the federal government significantly. 
The Supreme Court may permit much the same result through 
reliance on a different federal government power or through al-
lowing legislation to overcome the Court’s constitutional objec-
tion.121 Neal Devins argues that the Rehnquist Court’s deci-
sions invalidating federal laws on federalism grounds—
although much criticized by academics—do not impose onerous 
burdens or constraints on Congress in the law-making proc-
ess.122 Many of these decisions have given “Congress an oppor-
tunity to revisit the issue by making use of another source of 
 
 118. See Laura Langer & Paul Brace, The Preemptive Power of State Su-
preme Courts: Adoption of Abortion and Death Penalty Legislation, 33 POL’Y 
STUD. J. 317, 317 (2005) (finding that state courts exert considerable preemp-
tive power on the adoption of state legislation on abortion and the death pen-
alty). 
 119. 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995). 
 120. See Kerr, supra note 29, at 33 (observing that “Lopez resulted in very 
little change in substantive law” and left “state legislatures free to regulate 
guns in school zones”). Indeed, even the federal government could so regulate, 
with an amended law that had an interstate commerce condition, a law that 
was upheld. Id. 
 121. For example, after Lopez Congress reenacted the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act with a specific reference to interstate commerce. See Seth J. Safra, 
Note, The Amended Gun-Free School Zones Act: Doubt as to Its Constitutional-
ity Remains, 50 DUKE L.J. 637, 637–38 (2000). 
 122. Neal Devins, The Federalism-Rights Nexus: Explaining Why Senate 
Democrats Can Tolerate Rehnquist Court Decision Making but Not the 
Rehnquist Court, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1307, 1311–14 (2002). 
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federal power,” but Congress has not done so.123 Thus, decisions 
invalidating federal legislation are not necessarily more politi-
cally intrusive and judicially activist than decisions invalidat-
ing state legislation. 
Nonetheless, the two types of decisions are not strictly 
comparable, if only because scholars cannot agree on whether, 
according to the principles of federalism, invalidating a federal 
law is more legally valid and hence less activist than invalidat-
ing a state law, or vice versa. We maintain neutrality on the 
proper role of federalism, however, and do not ascribe greater 
or lesser activism to either type of statutory invalidation. 
B. CREATING AN EMPIRICAL MEASURE OF ACTIVISM 
Measuring judicial activism systematically across multiple 
cases and indicators would clearly represent a methodological 
advance over anecdotal discussion of individual cases or even 
over quantitative measures that reflect only one dimension or 
characteristic behavior associated with the concept. The ab-
sence of a precise definition of judicial activism complicates 
such a test but does not render the project impossible. Judge 
O’Scannlain argues that to identify activism, one “must estab-
lish a non-controversial benchmark by which to evaluate how 
far from the ‘correct’ decision the supposedly activist judge has 
strayed.”124 This standard probably necessitates unreliable sec-
ond-guessing of the Court’s legal judgments and is not amena-
ble to empirical testing.125 Moreover, Judge O’Scannlain’s stan-
dard is useful only when assessing individual decisions. 
However, even if it is difficult to argue that a specific decision 
is or is not activist, we believe that some systematic tendencies 
of activist decision making can be studied. The following sec-
tion sets forth such an approach. 
1. Voting Behavior in Judicial Review Cases 
For purposes of constructing a more systematic measure of 
judicial activism, we begin with the conventional measure re-
 
 123. Id. at 1316. 
 124. O’Scannlain, supra note 37, at 23. 
 125. Orin Kerr notes that “reasonable people can disagree on many legal 
questions” and that the evaluators’ “experiences, biases, and policy prefer-
ences” color their views, so that reliable identification of judicial activism is 
difficult. Kerr, supra note 29, at 32. William Marshall undertakes an excellent 
review of the Rehnquist Court’s alleged judicial activism on this case correct-
ness standard. See Marshall, supra note 15, at 1220. 
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flecting the Justices’ propensity to invalidate legislative enact-
ments. As noted above, the simplest measure of activism in-
volves the frequency with which Justices vote to strike stat-
utes.126 While incomplete, it provides relevant and valuable 
information. Above and beyond the prior research, it is impor-
tant to consider not just the absolute number of statutes in-
validated but the proportion invalidated in response to a chal-
lenge. In addition, it is also important to distinguish between 
federal and state statutes. 
To gather data on the Justices’ votes in cases involving ju-
dicial review of federal and state enactments, we began with 
the Original United States Supreme Court Judicial Database 
and the United States Supreme Court Justice-Centered Data-
bases compiled by Harold J. Spaeth and Sara C. Benesh.127 
These databases include the “authdec” variables, variables that 
enable the researcher to identify cases in which a constitutional 
provision was cited in support of a particular decision.128 We 
then read each such decision to determine whether a constitu-
tional challenge was brought to a federal or state statute as op-
posed to an administrative or other type of action. Because our 
database incorporates all cases in which the Justices were pre-
sented with the opportunity to invalidate a challenged statute, 
we were able to consider not only the Justices’ votes to invali-
date statutes, but also their votes to uphold them. We then re-
viewed concurring and dissenting opinions in these cases to en-
sure that these Justices actually passed on the statute’s 
constitutionality. We also read each decision to code for the 
presence or absence of other factors, including the participation 
of the Solicitor General. 
Table 1 reports the percentage of votes to invalidate a 
statute given the presence of a constitutional challenge, distin-
guishing between federal and state laws in the Rehnquist 
Court (1986–2004). Several findings are immediately obvious 
from these data. First, there is a clear discrepancy in the Jus-
tices’ responses to state and federal challenges. Justice Black-
 
 126. See supra Part I.B. 
 127. The S. Sidney Ulmer Project: U.S. Supreme Court Databases, http:// 
www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/sctdata.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2007). 
 128. See, e.g., HOWARD J. SPAETH, THE ORIGINAL UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT JUDICIAL DATABASE: 1953–2005 TERMS 39, http://www.as.uky.edu/ 
polisci/ulmerproject/allcourt_codebook.pdf (“[The authdec] variables specify 
the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to each 
legal provision that the Court considered in the case . . . .”). 
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mun, for example, was far more likely to strike a state law than 
a federal law. This trend was not universal, however, as Jus-
tices O’Connor and Kennedy voted to strike down state and 
federal laws at roughly the same ratio. Second, there are super-
ficially obvious differences in the Justices’ willingness to in-
validate statutes. Justice Brennan, for example, was more 
likely to strike both state and federal statutes than were other 
Justices. In contrast, Justices White and Powell were far less 
likely to vote to invalidate either state or federal enactments 
when compared to their brethren. 
 
Table 1: Statutory Invalidation in the Rehnquist Court 
 Justice Federal State 
 Marshall 41% 64% 
 Brennan 54% 65% 
 Blackmun 35% 62% 
 Breyer 36% 51% 
 Ginsburg 37% 54% 
 Kennedy 49% 48% 
 O’Connor 43% 44% 
 Powell 28% 33% 
 Rehnquist 36% 24% 
 Scalia 46% 39% 
 Souter 43% 59% 
 Stevens 31% 65% 
 Thomas 54% 37% 
 White 9% 39% 
 
The same analysis was conducted for Justices of the Bur-
ger Court (1969–1985), and the results are reported in table 2. 
The Burger Court statistics demonstrate greater disparities 
among the Justices in terms of their willingness to invalidate 
statutes. Justice Douglas, for example, voted to invalidate fed-
eral enactments in 80% of the cases in which such a statute 
was challenged, and a remarkable 84% of cases in which a state 
statute was challenged. In contrast, Justice Rehnquist stands 
out among his fellow Justices in terms of his clearly restraint-
oriented jurisprudence, voting to strike state and federal stat-
utes in only about 20% of cases in which a constitutional chal-
lenge was brought. 
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Table 2: Statutory Invalidation in the Burger Court 
 Justice Federal State 
 Marshall 51% 75% 
 Brennan 50% 74% 
 White 26% 46% 
 Blackmun 21% 51% 
 Powell 22% 49% 
 Rehnquist 19% 20% 
 Stevens 29% 61% 
 O’Connor 35% 30% 
 Stewart 33% 52% 
 Burger 20% 38% 
 Douglas 80% 84% 
 Black 62% 59% 
 Harlan 38% 58% 
 
These frequency distributions provide some basis upon 
which to compare the Justices’ activism in these two recent 
Courts. Yet used alone, this simple measure of activism is in-
complete to the extent that some votes to invalidate legislation 
are arguably more “legally legitimate” than others. In the next 
section, we modify this initial measure of activism by incorpo-
rating additional considerations into a total measure of activ-
ism, including the extent to which the Justices appear to be 
driven by their ideological preferences in connection with the 
exercise of judicial review, and the degree of consensus behind 
the decision to invalidate or uphold enactments. 
2. Additional Considerations: Ideology and Consensus 
As noted above, one major concern animating critics of ju-
dicial activism is that activist Justices “legislate from the 
bench” by voting to invalidate or uphold statutes based on their 
personal policy preferences rather than on legal principles. 
Thus, one indicator of such “inappropriate” result-oriented ac-
tivism would be the extent to which the Justices vote to invali-
date legislation based on that legislation’s substantive or policy 
content. A Justice who exercises the power of judicial review 
without regard for the ideological direction of the statute at is-
sue is arguably less activist than one whose votes appear 
driven by his or her attitudinal reaction to the substantive pol-
icy embodied in the enactment. To control for variation in the 
Justices’ ideological orientations toward judicial review, we cal-
culated the relationship between each Justice’s votes to invali-
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date legislation and the substantive policy content of the chal-
lenged enactment.129 We constructed a simple two-by-two table 
to reflect the relationship between (1) the number of votes to 
uphold or strike legislation and (2) the ideological direction of 
the statutory policy at issue. We then performed a chi-square 
test to determine if the statutes’ ideological direction relates to 
the Justices’ votes to strike.130 This test provided us with a chi-
square test statistic for each Justice reflecting the strength of 
the relationship between these two variables. Because these 
values were highly skewed, for purposes of constructing our 
measure we took the natural log of each Justice’s chi-square 
statistic. 
In addition, we created two variables to reflect the Justices’ 
willingness to vote to invalidate enactments in situations 
where less consensus existed regarding the statutes’ constitu-
tionality. As noted above, there is no sound way to measure the 
strength of a case or the correct outcome, but there are meas-
ures that may serve as proxies for case strength. One such 
proxy is the Solicitor General’s position on behalf of the United 
States. In our database of all cases involving judicial review of 
federal or state legislation, the Solicitor General participated 
often as either a party or an amicus. While the position of the 
Solicitor General is influenced to some degree by the ideological 
orientation of the executive branch, the Solicitor is regarded as 
a fair broker in these cases and sometimes is called the “Tenth 
Justice.”131 Observers claim that he has historically been com-
 
 129. The statute’s coding was based on the Spaeth Database codes reflect-
ing the ideological direction of the case outcome. If the decision to strike the 
statute was coded as liberal, the statute was deemed conservative. Thus, if a 
Supreme Court decision struck down a statute limiting the right to obtain an 
abortion (coded liberal), the underlying statute restricting the right to obtain 
an abortion was deemed conservative. See The S. Sidney Ulmer Project, The 
U.S. Courts of Appeals Database, http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/ 
appctdata.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2007) (describing the overall methodology 
for ideological coding). 
 130. As expected, most of the Justices showed an ideological determinant 
in their decision to strike a statute. These ranged from Justice Powell, who 
showed no statistically significant ideological determinant, to Justice Black-
mun, who showed the highest ideological effect. 
 131. See, e.g., Drew S. Days, III, When the President Says “No”: A Few 
Thoughts on Executive Power and the Tradition of Solicitor General Independ-
ence, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 509, 509–10 (2001) (describing the President’s 
occasional influence on the Solicitor General, but highlighting the broad tradi-
tion of independence); David M. Rosenzweig, Note, Confession of Error in the 
Supreme Court by the Solicitor General, 82 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2085 (1994) (“[B]y 
and large, Solicitors General have been free to formulate positions and make 
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mitted to the “rule of law” rather than to a partisan agenda.132 
Indeed, the Supreme Court sometimes requests the Solicitor’s 
views on a legal dispute, as the office commands a “unique re-
spect” at the Court.133 Invalidating statutes defended by the So-
licitor is thus arguably more activist to the extent the Solici-
tor’s position indicates something about the strength of legal 
arguments in support of a statute’s constitutionality, while in-
validating a statute that the Solicitor opposed might not be 
considered an activist decision at all.134 Indeed, the Solicitor is 
used in other research as control variable for decisions on un-
constitutionality.135 We recognize the ideological bias that is 
possible in connection with this measure, as the Solicitor’s of-
fice does often represent the President’s position. But we think 
this possibility does not render the measure invalid as a reflec-
tion on the legal strength of the Solicitor’s position given the 
nature of the Solicitor’s role. Moreover, the variable also meas-
ures the Justices’ overall level of deference to a coordinate 
branch. Thus, even if it does not perfectly measure the legal 
strength of a particular position, it does measure a Justice’s 
willingness to defy a coequal institution within the federal gov-
ernment, an important consideration in connection with the 
evaluation of judicial activism. While the Solicitor General’s 
position may not precisely capture legal accuracy, therefore, it 
 
arguments before the Supreme Court without undue interference from other 
elements of the executive branch.”). Some empirical research indicates that 
the executive branch ideologically influences the Solicitor, but the Solicitor 
best advances his client’s goals by respecting the institutional limits placed on 
the Court. See REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLI-
TICS OF LAW 104–05, 174–75 (1992). 
 132. LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND 
THE RULE OF LAW 3, 33–50, 277 (1987). Lincoln Caplan however notes that 
during the Reagan Administration the Solicitor General became a partisan 
advocate for the administration. Id. at 268–77.  
 133. See David A. Strauss, The Solicitor General and the Interests of the 
United States, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 172–73 (1998) (discussing the 
Solicitor’s reputation at the Court); Seth P. Waxman, Foreword: Does the So-
licitor General Matter?, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1117–18 (2001) (discussing the 
Solicitor General’s substantive and procedural influences on the Supreme 
Court). 
 134. See Drew S. Days, III, The Solicitor General and the American Legal 
Ideal, 49 SMU L. REV. 73, 79 (1995) (“Because of the respect to which the Con-
gress is entitled as a coordinate branch of the government, Solicitors General 
traditionally have recognized a general duty to defend congressional statutes 
against constitutional challenges.”). 
 135. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 83, at 313; Howard & Segal, supra 
note 23, at 138. 
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nonetheless may contribute useful information to a measure of 
judicial activism.136 
To incorporate the Solicitor’s position in our activism scale, 
we created a measure reflecting the degree to which the indi-
vidual Justices voted in conformity with or in opposition to the 
Solicitor’s position in all cases in which the Solicitor took a po-
sition on the statute at issue as either a party representative or 
an amicus. Again, we used the chi-square measure to reflect 
the strength of the relationship between the Solicitor’s position 
and the Justices’ vote in support of or in opposition to an en-
actment’s constitutionality. We regarded a ruling that is con-
trary to the Solicitor’s position as more activist. Because this 
variable was highly skewed, we transformed it by taking its 
natural log. 
In addition to a Justice’s overall level of agreement with 
the Solicitor, we also developed a measure reflecting the gen-
eral level of consensus behind his or her votes in these judicial 
review cases. Our rationale for this factor rests on the notion 
that a decision appears more result-oriented if it is the product 
of a narrow coalition of ideologically like-minded Justices.137 By 
contrast, a unanimous opinion or decision in which liberals and 
conservatives combine to invalidate or uphold a statute appears 
less ideological and more likely to be grounded in “legitimate” 
constitutional principles. For these reasons, we developed a 
measure of the average size of the coalition joined by each Jus-
tice in cases in which the Justice voted to invalidate an enact-
ment. For the nineteen Justices in our sample,138 this variable 
ranged from a low mean coalition size of 5.45 Justices to a high 
of 8.25 Justices. This measure contains some possible bias be-
cause it discriminates against the minority ideological coalition 
on the Court. Thus, if most of the Justices were conservative 
and voted ideologically, liberal Justices might falsely appear 
 
 136. See Stefanie A. Lindquist & David E. Klein, The Influence of Juris-
prudential Considerations on Supreme Court Decisionmaking: A Study of Con-
flict Cases, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 135, 155 (2006) (noting that the Court might 
adopt the Solicitor General’s position because it reflects the “legally stronger 
position,” but the position might appeal to the Justices regardless, because of 
their preference for deferring to the executive). 
 137. Those who argue that a statute may be invalidated only by a superma-
jority of the Court advocate for the use of this standard. See generally 
Caminker, supra note 59, at 94–101 (describing the mechanics of a superma-
jority voting protocol as applied to the Supreme Court). 
 138. We pooled the Rehnquist and Burger Courts to provide data for all 
Justices who served between 1969 and 2004. 
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more activist, when in fact the conservative majority was the 
group acting ideologically. For this reason, we constructed our 
composite measure of activism with and without this variable, 
as discussed below. 
3. Deriving a Composite Measure of Activism 
Our research objective was to create a measure of judicial 
activism that moves beyond simple voting frequencies to incor-
porate other factors related to activism and restraint, including 
the Justices’ ideological orientations and the legal strength of 
their choices to invalidate legislation. To do so, we began by 
calculating vote frequencies (decisions to strike or uphold laws) 
separately for state and federal statutes for each of the nine-
teen Justices in our database. For this purpose, we did not dis-
tinguish between the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, but simply 
pooled the Justices in our sample to construct a measure com-
paring the Justices across the entire time period. We then fac-
tor analyzed these vote frequencies per Justice with three other 
variables: (1) the Justice’s ideological consistency, as measured 
by the chi-square statistic reflecting the relationship between 
ideology and the Justices’ votes to strike; (2) the consistency 
with which the Justice agreed with the Solicitor, also measured 
by a chi-square statistic; and (3) the average coalition size sup-
porting the Justice’s voting positions. 
Factor analysis is a useful statistical technique in our 
study for the purpose of data reduction. In particular, factor 
analysis identifies patterns of variation among subjects’ charac-
teristics by taking correlated measures and reducing them to a 
single underlying dimension.139 It is also a useful method for 
creating a scale that reflects the subjects’ relative rating or 
ranking on the characteristics of interest, in this case judicial 
activism. For our purposes, we used the technique to construct 
a scale that enabled us to score the individual Justices in terms 
of their levels of activism, taking into account the variables de-
scribed above. 
We factor analyzed the variables using principle factor 
analysis, with varimax orthogonal rotation. The procedure pro-
duced one factor with an eigenvalue substantially greater than 
 
 139. See generally RAYMOND B. CATTELL, THE SCIENTIFIC USE OF FACTOR 
ANALYSIS IN BEHAVIORAL AND LIFE SCIENCES 493–537 (1978) (describing how 
to conduct factor analytic research); ALLEN YATES, MULTIVARIATE EXPLORA-
TORY DATA ANALYSIS: A PERSPECTIVE ON EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS 9–
27 (1987) (discussing the mechanics of the factor analysis model). 
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one; we thus retained that one factor for purposes of construct-
ing the factor score reflecting levels of judicial activism.140 The 
factor scores are standardized in that they are scaled with a 
mean of zero and with about two-thirds of the values falling be-
tween +1.00 and -1.00. For that reason, scores that are greater 
than +1.00 or less than -1.00 constitute outliers.141 The factor 
scores, along with the vote frequencies in judicial review cases, 
are presented in table 3. Positive values are associated with 
greater activism. 
 
Table 3: Judicial Activism Scores, 1969–2004 
Justice Statutory Overall  Factor Score 
 Invalidation Activism Without 
 Federal and State Factor Score Coalition Size 
  (rank)  (rank) (rank) 
Marshall 67.32 (3) 1.548 (3) 1.215 (3) 
Brennan 67.34 (2) 1.932 (1) 1.706 (2) 
Douglas 83.23 (1) 1.846 (2) 1.965 (1) 
Stevens 53.45 (5) .224 (6) -.279 (10) 
Blackmun 47.01 (9) -.427 (13) -.656 (15) 
Thomas 43.93 (13) .582 (4) .244 (5) 
Rehnquist 23.54 (19) -.508 (15) -.867 (17) 
Souter 52.75 (6) .193 (7) -.023 (7) 
Scalia 41.58 (14) -.041 (9) -.384 (13) 
Ginsburg 46.85 (11) .168 (8) -.136 (8) 
O’Connor 40.05 (16) -.409 (12) -.440 (14) 
Stewart 47.73 (10) -.406 (11) -.221 (9) 
Black 59.52 (4) .319 (5) 1.120 (4) 
White 39.60 (17) -1.003 (17) -1.020 (18) 
Kennedy 48.13 (8) -.436 (14) -.295 (11) 
Breyer 44.19 (12) -.139 (10) -.308 (12) 
Powell 41.39 (15) -.853 (16) -.681 (16) 
Burger 33.85 (18) -1.281 (18) -1.057 (19) 
Harlan∗ 51.28 (7) -1.306 (19) .120 (6) 
∗  Harlan’s scores are based on a limited number of votes; his scores are thus 
not reliable estimates. 
 
The most activist Justices for the full era are clearly the 
liberal Warren Court holdovers, including Justices Marshall, 
Brennan, and Douglas. In contrast, the least activist Justices 
 
 140. Use of principal component analysis produced substantially similar 
activism scores for the Justices. The factor loadings for our variables were: 
(1) Average Coalition Size: -.724; (2) Frequency of State Statute Invalidation: 
.650; (3) Frequency of Federal Statute Invalidation: .708; (4) Solicitor Support 
(Logged): -.683; and (5) Ideological Consistency (Logged): .690. 
 141. See R.J. RUMMEL, APPLIED FACTOR ANALYSIS 278–79 (1970) (discuss-
ing a technique for determining an outlier). 
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include Justices Burger and White. In addition, over the course 
of his career on the Court, Justice Rehnquist was also among 
the least activist Justices. Other Justices, including some who 
advocate a more restraintist orientation rhetorically, did not 
generate particularly low activism scores. For example, al-
though Justices Thomas and Scalia often claim that Justices 
should not undermine democratic processes through the exer-
cise of judicial review, they nevertheless ranked fourth and 
ninth, respectively, among the nineteen Justices we evaluated. 
As noted above, we also calculated the activism scores 
without the coalition variable, on grounds that the average coa-
lition size supporting a Justice’s position may be biased by the 
ideological balance on the Court. Although the scores with and 
without the coalition size variable are substantially the same, 
some Justices, such as Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist and Ste-
vens, appear less activist when coalition size is eliminated from 
consideration. Conversely, others, such as Justice Kennedy, see 
an increase in their activism scores. 
One limitation to this scaling method involves the compa-
rability of cases considered by the various Justices in our sam-
ple. Justice Brennan ruled on entirely different challenges than 
did Justice Breyer, who took Justice Brennan’s position on the 
Court, and this fact inevitably limits direct comparisons of their 
activism. The truest comparison of relative activism would nec-
essarily involve Justices hearing exactly the same cases. To 
overcome the “different case” problem, we created a cumulative 
score for the most recent natural court, beginning with Justice 
Breyer’s appointment to Justice Brennan’s position on the 
bench. 
Unfortunately, nine Justices are too few to permit a valid 
factor analysis, so we constructed an activism score for these 
Justices using a different method. First, we standardized the 
component variables (ideology chi-square, Solicitor chi-square 
and average coalition size) as z-scores because they are meas-
ured on different metrics.142 We then created a cumulative 
scale of these scores after switching signs where appropriate. 
Table 4 reports these cumulative activism scores for the com-
mon cases heard by the Rehnquist Natural Court (1994–2004). 
 
 
 142. In the original factor analysis, this standardization was not necessary 
because the method of factor analysis standardized the constituent variables. 
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Table 4: Judicial Activism Scores, Rehnquist Natural Court, 1994–2004 
 Justice Cumulative Activism Scale 
  (rank) 
 Rehnquist -1.781 (7) 
 Thomas 2.809 (2) 
 Scalia 1.946 (3) 
 Souter 1.640 (4) 
 Ginsburg .323 (5) 
 Stevens 2.966 (1) 
 Kennedy -.123 (6) 
 O’Connor -4.151 (9) 
 Breyer -3.630 (8) 
 
In considering these scores, it is important to recognize 
that they are useful as a metric for internal comparisons of the 
Justices on the Rehnquist Court only, as they rely on a differ-
ent scaling technique than the scores generated in table 3. The 
results of this analysis confirm recent observations that Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas were relatively more activist in the 
last eleven years of the Rehnquist Court, although Justice Ste-
vens was likewise activist, and that the Justices generally con-
sidered to be centrist were the least activist. The activism of 
the current Justices, however, pales next to the historic activ-
ism of Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Douglas, as evidenced 
in table 3. 
The accuracy of our activism scale depends on the validity 
of its components. The Justices varied significantly across the 
three variables we created measuring ideological consistency, 
deference to the Solicitor, and average supporting coalition size. 
More finely grained analyses of activism might be instructive. 
For example, one might study the relative activism of Justices 
for different categories of constitutional challenges or different 
categories of underlying statutes. A more refined measure of 
activism would also take into account deference to existing 
precedent. Yet the measures we created reflect an initial effort 
to assess the Justices’ relative activism while taking into ac-
count considerations beyond their votes to invalidate legislative 
enactments. And while in most cases our measure confirms ex-
isting portrayals of the individual Justices, it does suggest that 
alternative considerations can affect our assessments of the 
Justices’ relative positions as activist or restraintist jurists. 
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  CONCLUSION   
As noted above, our approach to measuring judicial activ-
ism attempts to move beyond current measurement techniques 
to incorporate other relevant considerations into an assessment 
of activism and restraint. As it represents an initial effort to 
consider these alternative factors, it remains incomplete. Our 
legal qualifying variables do not entirely capture the legal va-
lidity of the constitutional challenge, and each has its own im-
perfections. Future researchers may design new metrics to cap-
ture the “legal validity” of the Court’s decision to strike or 
uphold a given statute. 
Furthermore, our objective in this Article was to present a 
purely descriptive measure of judicial activism. We do not pre-
sume that judicial activism is a good or bad thing, and one 
could make a strong theoretical argument that a given Justice 
was too deferential and insufficiently activist (e.g., Justice 
White in review of federal statutes). Our baseline for activism 
is essentially a Thayerian one, characterizing as activist those 
statutory invalidations where unconstitutionality is not per-
fectly clear as a legal matter. 
The scaling of activism does demonstrate that recent com-
plaints about the unusually aggressive conservative judicial ac-
tivism find only modest support. While conservative Justices 
such as Scalia and Thomas were relatively activist in the con-
text of the Rehnquist Court, their relative degree of activism 
was substantially less than the activism of the liberal Warren 
Court holdovers on the Burger Court. And while the later years 
of the Rehnquist Court witnessed a period of conservative ac-
tivism, this activism was fairly modest when viewed in historic 
context. 
